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Rogowski: Design Patent Infringement

DAMAGES FOR PARTIAL PRODUCT DESIGN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT
Patryk Oskar Rogowski *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I of the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 1
The power of the patent holder is extraordinarily strong as it grants
the patent holder a monopoly over the invention. 2 As the Supreme
Court noted, “The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.” 3
In the 2016 term, the Supreme Court of the United States was
faced with the issue of determining the appropriate damages for infringement of design patents when the infringed design constituted
only a small piece of the end-product. 4 In Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co, 5 the jury in the District Court found that Samsung infringed

*

B.A. in Political Science and Economics, Stony Brook University 2014; J.D. Candidate
2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to give special thanks to
Professor Rena Seplowitz for her patience, support, and encouragement throughout the entire
writing process and law school. I would like to thank the members of the Touro Law Review, especially my Notes Editor Rhona Amorado. Lastly, I would like to express the deepest thanks to my family and friends who have provided enormous support and motivation
throughout my law school career.
1 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 2.
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M. B. H., 426
F. Supp 143, 146 (D.D.C. 1976).
3 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
4 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
5 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
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three design patents owned by Apple. 6 The jury awarded Apple the
total amount of profits that Samsung earned in selling the smartphone
device at issue. 7 To be precise, the full amount of profits included
profits derived from components of Samsung’s devices, which were
designed exclusively by Samsung and had no connection to Apple in
any way. 8
The Federal Circuit upheld the District Court’s verdict and
award. 9 The Federal Circuit interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 289 10 to mean
that the infringing “article of manufacture” in a multicomponent device refers to the end-product. 11 This narrow reading of the statute
underlay Samsung’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 12
In its petition, Samsung argued that the Court should apply an
apportionment test, which would result in damages that are proportional to the infringed patents in the final article of manufacture. 13
Apple, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court should uphold the entire-profit test applied by both the District Court and the
Federal Circuit. 14
On December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit interpreted Section 289 too narrowly, and that lower
courts can interpret the term article of manufacture to mean either a
final product as a whole or one component of the final product. 15 The
Court, in a brief and limited opinion, reversed the decision and remanded it to the Federal Circuit. 16 In turn, the Federal Circuit re6

Id.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’g in part, rev’g in
part 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
10 See infra text accompanying note 57.
11 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001.
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Writ of
Certiorari].
13 Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner]. A court applying the apportionment test would first find the ratio of the total
components of the multicomponent device and the infringing components. Id. The court
would then apply damages proportionally to that ratio. Id. If three components in the device
were infringing, but the entire device was made up of 100 components, the infringed party
would be entitled to three percent of the total profits. Id. Thus, Samsung would only pay for
what it infringed. Id.
14 Brief for Respondent at 4, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. Under this argument, Samsung would forfeit profits for components of the device, which Apple had no part in creating. Id.
15 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 431.
16 Id.
7
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manded the case to the District Court with explicit permission to
formulate a new test in dealing with infringements of multicomponent devices. 17
Broadening a definition of a term or phrase in patent law may
lead to an increase in litigation. 18 In Apple, the Supreme Court gave
lower courts the opportunity to broaden the meaning of article of
manufacture. 19 Broadening of the statutory language is likely to create confusion among lower courts as to how exactly to apply the statute. 20 Further, the Federal Circuit, in remanding the case to the District Court, did not provide guidance as to what test should be applied
in multicomponent device infringement cases, such as Apple. Leaving the task to lower courts could add to the complexity of interpreting and applying Section 289. In determining what test the courts
should ultimately adopt, it is important to analyze the purpose of design patents, the statutory language governing design patent awards,
and economic implications that will result from the application and
enforcement of each test.
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court erred by stating a
broader interpretation of Section 289 may be appropriate without
providing clear guidelines as to how courts should apply this broader
interpretation. This Note will propose four tests that the judicial
branch could apply to provide predictability to litigants and direction
to courts. 21
This Note will be divided into twelve sections. Section II will
discuss design patents, including the key differences between a design patent and a utility patent. Section III will examine the Patent
Act of 1952, and introduce Section 289, which is at the heart of this
Note. Section IV will provide the procedural history of the Apple litigation. Section V will analyze the arguments presented by both parties at the Supreme Court. Section VI will discuss the important
2016 Supreme Court decision in Apple, in which the Court found itself with the task of defining the phrase article of manufacture in Section 289. Section VII will examine the history of apportionment, the
17 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 7, 2017).
18 Lucas S. Osborn, Ripple Effects in the Law: The Broadening Meaning of an “Offer to
Sell” in Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 546, 556 (2014).
19 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 431.
20 Id. The confusion stems primarily from a lack of guidance as to when the term should
apply to the final product and when it should apply solely to the infringing component. Id.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 233-302.
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leading method courts utilized in dealing with similar damages issues. Section VIII will discuss the importance of rewards for innovators. Section IX will present the judicial approaches to damages in
utility patent cases. Section X will propose four tests that the judiciary could adopt for design patent infringement cases in which only
one or a few components in a multicomponent product are infringed.
This section will analyze how each proposed approach would apply
to Apple if a court were to adopt the applicable test. Section XI will
focus on proposed legislative solutions to clarify Section 289 and
provide predictability to future litigants and guidance to the courts.
Finally, Section XII will conclude that a consumer demand approach
is the best approach for the Supreme Court to ultimately adopt.
II.

PATENTS IN GENERAL

There are two main types of patents––design patents and utility patents. 22 Courts treat them separately when it comes to awarding
damages, and thus, it is critical that inventors determine what type of
patent applies to their product because each type protects a product
differently, which ultimately affects how damages are calculated. 23
Despite the differences between design and utility patents,
courts sometimes treat design patents and utility patents similarly. 24
In certain jurisdictions, “courts have . . . required some degree of ‘patentable distinction’ or ‘inventive faculty’ similar to the obviousness
requirement for utility patents.” 25 However, in general, the courts,
especially in the realm of awarding damages, treat design and utility
patents differently.
A.

Design Patents

A design patent is defined, generally, as “a patent granted for
22 Additionally, there are plant patents, but they are outside the scope of this Note. See 35
U.S.C. § 161 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
23 Utility vs. Design, NEUSTEL, ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
https://www.neustel.com/patents/utility-vs-design/ (last visited March 13, 2017).
24 Bruce A. Kugler, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, 38 COLO. LAW. 71, 73
(2009).
25 Id.; see In re Bartlett, 300 F.2d 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Fields v. Schuyler, 472
F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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a new, original, and ornamental design 26 for an article of manufacture.” 27 Notably, a design patent does not protect utilitarian features
of the product, which are “afford[ed a] legally separate protection.” 28
A design patent does not protect functional aspects of an article of
manufacture but rather its appearance and visual features. 29 Design
patents require the design to be “new, original, and ornamental.” 30
Design patents, like the ones at issue in Apple, provide protections for
inventions including an animated graphical user interface, 31 ornamental design of a keyboard, 32 or application icon. 33
A design patent is of great importance to an innovator. 34 Design patents provide the inventor with a monopoly over the design for
fifteen years from the date of issue. 35 As evidenced by Apple, a design patent is so valuable in its nature that its infringement warrants
aggressive litigation between two of the world’s largest smartphone
device manufacturers. 36
B.

Utility Patents

While a design patent protects the aesthetic and visual features of an article, 37 a utility patent protects how the product works
and functions. 38 Utility patents originally protected primarily
mechanical and electrical devices. 39 However, today, utility patents
26 In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An ornamental design has “no use
other than its visual appearance.”).
27 Design Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
28 A Guide to Filing a Design Patent Application, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/pdf/brochure_05.pdf. (last
visited Apr. 11, 2017). Utilitarian features are features which are functional and serve some
purpose of use, as opposed to decorative or ornamental use. Id.
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
30 RONALD B. HILDRETH, ET AL., PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 1:7.2 (4th ed.
2016).
31 U.S. Patent No. D613,300 (issued Apr. 6, 2010).
32 U.S. Patent No. D616,886 (issued June 1, 2010).
33 U.S. Patent No. D671,558 (issued Nov. 27, 2012).
34 See generally William J. Seymour & Andrew W. Torrance, (R)evolution in Design Patentable Subject Matter: The Shifting Meaning of “Article of Manufacture”, 17 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 183 (2013).
35 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012). The term for a design patent was extended to 15 years from
the date of grant for applications filed on or after May 13, 2015.
36 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
37 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
38 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
39 J. David Gonce, My Client Has This Great Idea. Now, What am I Supposed to Do With
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protect a wider array of subject matter such as computer programs, 40
methods of doing business, 41 and genetically modified living organisms. 42
A utility patent gives the inventor a monopoly to manufacture,
use, and sell the patented device for twenty years from the filing
date. 43 Utility patents cover parts of the smartphone such as list
scrolling, 44 application programming interfaces for scrolling operations, 45 or graphical user interface for displaying structured electronic
documents. 46 Those three utility patents were part of the Apple litigation at the District Court, and the Federal Circuit upheld their infringement. 47
III.

THE PATENT ACT OF 1952

The Patent Act of 1952 was a congressional initiative to codify federal patent laws. 48 The Act established Title 35 of the United
States Code. 49 One of the Act’s purposes was to provide protections
for the patent holder. 50 While there is no physical barrier preventing
any individual from explicitly infringing on a patent, patent holders
have the option to pursue a financial or equitable remedy when they
believe that their patent was infringed. 51 Sometimes, the award of an
injunction against the infringer is not enough and the court also
awards damages. 52 If the patent holder obtains an injunction against
the infringer, there is a high likelihood that the infringer has proIt? Protecting Your Client’s Intellectual Property, 42 TENN. BAR J. 14, 15 (2006).
40 See generally Dealtracker, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing a
patent for a program which aided the processing of credit card applications over electronic
networks).
41 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (discussing a patent for
the method of conducting on-line sales).
42 See generally Dealtracker, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1315; see generally Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that “a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under [35 U.S.C.] § 101”).
43 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
44 U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (Issued Dec. 23, 2008).
45 U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (Issued Nov. 30, 2010).
46 U.S. Patent No. 7,864,163 (Issued Jan. 4, 2011).
47 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
48 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:23 (4th ed. 2016).
49 Id.
50 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
51 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
52 Id. (specific statutory language permitting financial damages for infringement).
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duced, manufactured, and sold the product containing an infringing
article of manufacture. 53 A patent holder is unlikely to be aware of
the infringement at the early stages of the infringer’s manufacturing
process and before sales have begun to occur. 54
The core question behind any patent litigation is: What appropriate amount of damages is the plaintiff patent-holder entitled to
recover from the defendant patent-infringer? 55 In determining the
appropriate amount of damages in design patent cases, the courts
look to 35 U.S.C. § 289 for answers. 56 The statute provides:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design,
without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented
design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any
article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2)
sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to
which such design or colorable imitation has been
applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his
total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any
United States district court having jurisdiction of the
parties. 57
The natural reading of this section suggests that if a design patent is
infringed, the plaintiff can recover all profits derived from the infringer’s sale of the product. 58
Apple presented the Supreme Court with a complex scenario,
which has recently caused great confusion in the Federal Circuit. 59 In
granting certiorari, the Court was tasked to answer “[W]here a design
patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award
of infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the
53 See Apple, 786 F.3d at 983 (stating that Samsung was selling the smartphone containing
infringing patents).
54 See Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesaler Corporation, 127 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing that plaintiff learned about infringement when a customer reported seeing similar product at defendant’s place of business); Herbert J. Hammond et al.,
Intellectual Property Issues in E-Commerce, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV 743, 744 (2014)
(explaining that United States patent law also includes a “mere offer to sell” an infringing
product).
55 Matthew C. Holohan, Making Sense of Apportionment in Patent Damages: Strategy in
the Face of Uncertainty, 44 COLO. LAW. 81, 81 (2015) (calling damages an “important aspect of litigation”).
56 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001.
57 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006) (emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 See Apple, 786 F.3d. at 983.
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component?”60 On December 6, 2016, the Court, in a brief ruling,
held that the term article of manufacture in Section 289 is “broad
enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product.” 61
IV.

APPLE V. SAMSUNG: PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The litigation arose out of the three design patents owned by
Apple, which cover various features of smartphones. 62 All three patents are narrow, protecting very specific parts of the product, and
“claim only partial features of a smartphone’s design.” 63 The first
design patent, D618,677, covers a black rectangular round-cornered
front face. 64 The second design patent, D593,087, covers a “substantially similar rectangular round-cornered front face plus the surrounding rim or ‘bezel’. . . .” 65 The third design patent, D604,305, covers
“a particular colorful grid of sixteen icons.” 66 Apple sued Samsung
for the infringement of these design patents. 67
The litigation at the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California resulted in a jury verdict in favor of
Apple. 68 After the victory, Apple filed a motion for supplemental
damages and prejudgment interest. 69
Samsung appealed to the Federal Circuit on two different
counts. 70 First, Samsung argued the District Court erred by failing to

60 Question Presented, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). In 1998,
the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he statute requires the disgorgement of the infringers' profits
to the patent holder, such that the infringers retain no profit from their wrong.” Nike Inc. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In 2009, the Federal Circuit
overturned a $357,693,056.18 verdict against Microsoft for its infringement of a date-picker
feature in its Outlook software. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 30 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). The court held that “the infringing use of
Outlook's date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and that
the portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker tool is
exceedingly small.” Id. at 1333.
61 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 435.
62 Apple, 2012 WL 3071477 at *1.
63 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6.
64 See Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6.
65 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6.
66 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 55.
67 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
68 Apple, 2012 WL 3071477.
69 Apple, 786 F.3d at 983.
70 Id.
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properly instruct the jury to focus solely on the ornamental components of the product. 71 The Federal Circuit held that the District
Court did not err when it failed to instruct the jury on a proper method to determine the infringement of design patents. 72 Rather, it permitted the jury to compare the two products side-by-side and decide
whether similarities existed. 73 That analysis, Samsung alleged, was
unfairly prejudicial and too broad to establish infringement on three
design patents. 74
Second, Samsung argued that the District Court erred in
regard to the amount of damages awarded to Apple. 75 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to award Apple the entire amount of profits from Samsung’s sale of smartphones, which
contained the patented designs worth $399 million. 76 The court relied on Section 289 to determine that the “total amount of profits”
was appropriate. 77 This ruling required the court to determine the
meaning of the term article of manufacture, the question ultimately
presented to the Supreme Court.
When interpreting what an article of manufacture is in a multicomponent product, the Federal Circuit held that the entire
smartphone device is the only allowable article of manufacture. 78
The Federal Circuit, in its interpretation of Section 289, held that if a
product bears a design, which is protected by an existing patent, the
infringer is liable for the entire amount of the profits derived from the
product, “no matter how minor the patented design in relation to the
product as a whole.” 79 The Federal Circuit did not engage in any
complex interpretation of Section 289. 80 Rather, the court held that

71

Id.
Samsung, on the other hand, argued that the District Court should have instructed the
jury that “each of these patents contains indisputably unprotected elements within its overall
claimed ‘ornamental’ design.” See Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. Similarly, the Federal
Circuit issued a simple interpretation in Nike, when it held that “The statute requires the disgorgement of the infringers' profits to the patent holder, such that the infringers retain no
profit from their wrong.” Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
73 Apple, 678 F.3d at 1330.
74 Id at 1332.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Apple, 786 F.3d at 983.
79 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24.
80 See generally Apple, 786 F.3d 983.
72
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there is “clear statutory language,” which “prohibits [the court] from
adopting a ‘causation’ rule.” 81 The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s narrow reading of Section 289 of the Patent Act. 82 Samsung subsequently filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, arguing that the Federal Circuit erred by reading
Section 289 too narrowly. 83
V.

ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

After losing in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Samsung filed a writ for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. 84 The core arguments revolved around
the proper interpretation of the ambiguously worded Section 289 of
the Patent Act. 85 If the statute were to be read narrowly, as held by
the District Court and upheld by the Federal Circuit, then Apple
would prevail because the article of manufacture would encompass
the entire multicomponent device––the finished product. 86 If the
statute were to be read more broadly, Samsung would prevail. 87 A
broader reading would mean that the article of manufacture could be
applied on a case-by-case basis, and Samsung, on remand, would be
able to make an argument that the appropriate damages are those of
the specific infringing components, not the device as a whole. 88
Samsung argued the holding of the lower court “provide[s] a
vehicle for design-patent holders to obtain unjustified windfalls far
exceeding the conceivable value of any inventive contribution.”89
Specifically, Samsung pointed out the lower court’s observation that
“even if the patent features contributed 1% of the value of Samsung’s
phones, Apple gets 100% of Samsung’s profits.” 90 Consequently,
Samsung warned that this decision is “an open invitation to litigation
81

Id.
Id.
83 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
84 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
85 See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13; see generally Brief for Respondent,
supra note 14.
86 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13.
87 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14.
88 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436.
89 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
90 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
82
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abuse” which may bring a “new flood of extortionate patent litigation.” 91
By Apple’s own admission, the narrow patents, which were
infringed, are not components that drive sales. 92 Rather, Apple stated
that the “software creates the largest share of [the] product’s value.”93
The functionality of the smartphone itself, including the software and
the smartphone’s other capabilities, is the main selling point of the
device. 94 Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in an 8-0 opinion, authored
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 95 interpreted the statute more broadly, to
cover both the finished product and individual components. 96
A.

Arguments of the Appellant, Samsung

Samsung had a lot to lose at the Supreme Court. 97 Not only
was Samsung fighting to overturn the judgment of the lower court but
it also knew this case was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
settle the issue of appropriate damages for infringement of a multicomponent product, after previously denying certiorari on this issue
many times. 98
The Supreme Court heard arguments on October 11, 2016,
and focused a significant amount of time on the article of manufacture question. 99 Kathleen M. Sullivan, appearing on behalf of Samsung, argued strongly that the Federal Circuit’s holding “was wrong
as a matter of law.” 100 She stated, “It is wrong . . . to hold that the entire product is necessarily the article of manufacture from which you
measure total profit.” 101 Answering Justice Ginsburg’s question,
“how would [the Court] determine the profit attributable to the rele91

Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9.
93 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9.
94 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9.
95 Following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016, the Supreme Court
sat with only eight justices.
96 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
97 Judgment of the lower court awarded nearly $1 billion in damages. See Apple, 2012 WL
3071477.
98 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
99 Oral Argument, Samsung v. Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-777 (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
100 Id. at 6:35.
101 Id. at 6:40.
92
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vant article of manufacture?,” Ms. Sullivan responded that the proper
method would be “through ordinary accounting that would look to
the cost of goods sold in relation to revenues for the relevant component.” 102 To determine the cost of goods sold, Ms. Sullivan suggested the trial court should rely on the testimony of expert witnesses.103
Although conceding that the “total profit from the article of manufacture may sometimes be a substantial part of the total profit on the
product,” Ms. Sullivan argued that the burden of proof would be on
the patent-holder to “prove that the bulk of the profits came from [the
given article of manufacture].” 104
1. Purchaser Motivation and Apportionment
In its brief, Samsung argued “consumers purchased
Samsung . . . phones overwhelmingly because of their functional,
non-design features.” 105 Relying on Apple’s market research, Samsung argued that other factors drove the sales, which outweighed the
infringing design patents at bar. 106 The value consumers placed on
various functional aspects of the phone (e.g., screen size, company
reputation, and the app market) outweighed the value consumers
placed on the design features of the smartphones in question. 107 In
fact, “according to . . . Apple market data, a phone’s ‘design’ in general was a reason for only 1% of Apple’s purchases and 5% of Android purchases, far below other considerations such as services, multimedia functions, ease of use, and brand.” 108
Furthermore, Samsung pointed out that Section 289 “limits
recoverable total profit to that attributable to the article of manufac102

Id. at 7:34.
Id. at 8:29.
104 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 9:45. Much of the oral argument focused on the
Volkswagen Beetle car. Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 9:45. Primarily, there were questions whether the VW Beetle’s peculiar shape drove the sales. Justice Kennedy, questioning
Ms. Sullivan, raised the issue that it would be unfair if the Volkswagen Beetle design was
“done in three days” and “was a stroke of genius,” to “give three days’ profit.” Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 9:45.
105 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9 (emphasis in original).
106 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9.
107 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9.
108 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10. If the Supreme Court were to formulate a
test that apportioned the damages for the infringement of a design patent, which composed a
small percentage of the smartphone, it seems reasonable that the value placed by the purchasing consumer on given design and functional parts would have to be taken into consideration.
103
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ture to which an infringing design is ‘applied.’” 109 Samsung argued
that the article of manufacture does not necessarily have to “be the
entire product as sold.” 110 Rather, the article of manufacture can be a
small component of a finished product, meaning the “finished product can be made from numerous articles of manufacture.” 111
Realizing that the apportionment argument has flaws, as it
would be very difficult for courts to administer, Samsung argued that:
Consumers may value the front face because it’s
scratch-resistant, because it’s water-resistant, because
it’s shatterproof. We’re going to give the patentholder under our article-of-manufacture test all the
profits for the front face, even if it includes profit from
those non-design features of the front face, whether
the pure apportionment test or pure causation test
would limit the profits to the profits from the design
parts rather than the functional parts. 112
Conceding that this proposed test would be “a little over inclusive,”
Samsung claimed “plaintiffs should be happy for that.” 113
2. Analysis of Samsung’s Apportionment and
Purchaser Motivation Argument
Each individual purchasing a smartphone values different
parts of a smartphone differently. 114 Person A might put great value
on a smartphone’s GPS capabilities and the size of the app store, and
put little value on the smartphone’s rectangular round-cornered design. 115 On the other hand, Person B might, as Steve Jobs did, find
the aesthetic appearance and design of the smartphone to be of enormous value, particularly if that purchaser uses the smartphone solely
109

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25.
111 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25. This argument, accepted by the Court, likely
limits Apple’s recovery to only the profits Samsung derived from the three articles of manufacture. Apple, however, on remand in the district court, could prove that the three articles
substantially influenced a majority of consumers who purchased Samsung’s smartphone.
112 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 10:50.
113 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 10:50.
114 Christopher Versace, What Do Consumers Want in a New Smartphone, FORBES (Aug.
21, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisversace/2013/08/21/what-do-consumers-wantin-a-new-smartphone/#6fcb91c747b3.
115 Id.
110
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for its non-smart features. 116 Thus, if the Supreme Court, in the future, formulated an apportionment test, it would have great difficulty
doing so because of the subjective nature of the value placed by purchasing consumers on various aspects, both functional and ornamental, of the smartphone itself. 117 Additionally, many consumers are
not interested in solely the functional aspect, or solely the design aspect. 118 Many consumers are interested in both aspects, which makes
formulating a test for all courts to apply a tremendous challenge. 119
It seems natural for a court analyzing the issue to consider the
motivation of the consumers who purchased the smartphones in question; however, that factor should not be dispositive. 120 Plaintiffs,
when arguing that they suffered pecuniary losses as a result of a defendant’s infringement, should be permitted to provide testimony or
survey evidence that may show that consumers were, in part, motivated to purchase the defendant’s product based on an infringing
component. 121
The case, remanded to the District Court with the statute’s
newly broadened definition, provides a heavier burden to plaintiff in
establishing that consumers were motivated to purchase the defendant’s products directly because of the infringed designs. 122 While this
will not serve to show per se infringement, it will likely play a substantial role in the determination of appropriate damages. 123 If the
main driver of sales of the defendant’s product is shown to be the

116

James B. Stewart, How Jobs Put Passion Into Products, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/business/how-steve-jobs-infused-passion-into-acommodity.html?pagewanted=all. (“In most people's vocabularies, design means veneer. It's
interior decorating . . . . But to me, nothing could be further from the meaning of design.
Design is the fundamental soul of a human-made creation that ends up expressing itself in
successive outer layers of the product or service.”); also see Jessica Dolcourt, Why
Smartphone Design Matters, CNET (May 5, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/whysmartphone-design-matters-smartphones-unlocked/.
117 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It does not necessarily follow
that because no one factor is dispositive all factors are equally important, or indeed that all
factors will have relevance in every case. The factors should not merely be tallied but
should be weighed according to their significance in the case.”).
121 Electro-Mech. Corp. v. Power Distrib. Prods., 970 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (W.D. Va.
2013) (“The plaintiff must prove that the customer's decision to buy the larger product in the
first place is motivated by the presence of the patented component.”).
122 Id.
123 Id.
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component which infringed on plaintiff’s patent, then Apple may argue that, even under the new broad reading of Section 289, the entire
amount of defendant’s profits should be awarded. 124
3. Language of Section 289
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Samsung argued that Section 289’s language regarding the infringer’s liability “to the extent of
his total profit” 125 “obviously cannot mean all of the company’s
worldwide profit.” 126 Samsung further argued that Congress, in formulating and enacting Section 289, did not intend to radically alter
the predecessor statute, which was enacted in 1887. 127 At that time,
Congress sought to protect design patents for items such as “carpets,
wallpapers, and oil-cloths.” 128 Samsung argued that in the legislative
history, Congress did not intend design patents to apply to advanced
technologies, which “embody hundreds of thousands of functional
features having nothing to do with any patented design.” 129 Although
our legal system is built upon precedent, we must focus on the fact
that Congress, in the year 1887, was likely not thinking about products that contained “hundreds of thousands of functional features.” 130
4. Analysis of Samsung’s Section 289 Argument
The meaning of Section 289 is an important issue which requires clarification by Congress or the Supreme Court. 131 Since a design patent issued in the United States only applies to products sold in
the United States, Congress or the Supreme Court could clarify that
damages are limited to sales in the United States. 132 If a court were to
124 Id. This outcome would be supported under the Supreme Court’s decision, as a final
product is an acceptable interpretation of article of manufacture.
125 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
126 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24.
127 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25.
128 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25.
129 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25 (“Congress never suggested that the same assumptions would hold for complex products like smartphones, which . . . embody hundreds
of thousands of functional features having nothing to do with any patented design.”).
130 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13.
131 The next best alternative would be for a district court or Federal Circuit to take this
view in the Apple case.
132 Protecting
Intellectual
Property
Rights
(IPR)
Overseas,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-
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hold that the infringer is liable, according to the statutory language,
“to the extent of his total profit,” the court could certainly limit recovery without unduly burdening either party’s interest. 133 For example, a court could interpret “to the extent of [the infringer’s] total
profit” 134 to mean the extent of the infringer’s total profits derived
from the sale of the product within the United States. 135 This distinction could also serve as a deterrent to infringing manufacturers. 136 If
the manufacturer will lose all of its profits from each smartphone device sold within the United States, it is more likely to create a
smartphone, which will not infringe at all on any patent. 137 It is highly unlikely for a phone manufacturer in another country to create a
smartphone for which it will net zero profits in the United States. 138
Furthermore, Samsung’s allegation that the total profit would
encompass “the company’s worldwide profit” of all products is a
flawed argument. 139 Under this argument, a court would be extremely unlikely to find that Samsung’s infringement of three design patents warrants Apple to receive all profits Samsung earned from its
entire product line, including smart watches, televisions, headsets,
and other products manufactured by Samsung. 140 Samsung argues
that non-infringing articles should not be included in the award. 141 It
is highly unlikely that a court, under a narrow reading of Section 289,
would permit an award of damages derived from the sale of defendant’s non-infringing articles. 142 Thus, Samsung’s argument that “the
intellectual-property-rights-ipr (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (“The rights granted by a U.S.
patent extend only throughout the territory of the United States and have no effect in a foreign country.”).
133 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Congress intended to set statutory damages high in the intellectual property area for the
purposes of deterrence (“Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter others
from infringing intellectual property rights.
It is important that the cost
of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compliance, so that persons who use or distribute intellectual property have a strong incentive to abide by the copyright laws.” H.R.
Rep. No. 106–216, at 6 (1999)).
137 H.R. Rep. No. 106–216, at 6 (1999) (discussing the power of deterrence).
138 Id.
139 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 27.
140 AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing a
part of the District Court’s judgment because “the reasonable royalty reward included damages for the sale of non-infringing products.”).
141 See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (providing that
the only product at issue is a smartphone).
142 See supra note 139.
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text of Section 289 compels reversal” is faulty. 143 Rather, the text, if
anything, needs clarification and simple explanation by the Supreme
Court, or a statutory amendment by Congress. 144
B.

Arguments of the Appellee, Apple

Named Time Magazine’s “Invention of the Year” in 2007, the
iPhone was greatly praised not solely for its functional features but
also critically for its appearance and design. 145 In the cover page article, discussing the first reason why Apple’s iPhone is “the best thing
invented this year,” Time Magazine noted:
Most high-tech companies don’t take design seriously.
They treat it as an afterthought. Window-dressing.
But one of Jobs’ basic insights about technology is
that good design is actually as important as good technology. All the cool features in the world won’t do
you any good unless you can figure out how to use
said features, and feel smart and attractive while doing
it. 146
1. Design Fueled Sales
Apple’s brief referred to reviews from various sources, which
focused on the iPhone’s design, all to drive home the point that the
design patents at issue fueled the sales. 147 The New York Times described the iPhone “as ‘gorgeous’ with a ‘shiny black [front face],
rimmed by mirror finish stainless steel’ and a ‘spectacular’ user interface.” 148 Both of the design features complimented by The New York
Times are protected by the patents infringed here, the D593,087 patent (shiny black front-face) and the D604,305 (colorful user interface). 149 Other design compliments came from the Wall Street Jour143

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24.
See discussion infra Sections X and XI.
145 Lev Grossman, Invention of the Year: The iPhone, TIME MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1677329_1678542,00.html.
146 Id.
147 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5.
148 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5. See also David Pogue, Apple Waves Its
Wand, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/technology/
10cnd-pogue.html.
149 U.S. Patent D604,305 (issued Nov. 17, 2009); U.S. Patent D593,087 (issued May 26,
2009).
144
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nal, 150 which along with The New York Times and Time Magazine,
are not publications that generally focus their product reviews on design, and thus, their praise of the iPhone’s design speaks volumes
about the partial motivation of customers who choose to purchase this
product. 151
2. Substantial Similarity
Samsung relied on the statement of one of its executives who
said “[T]he difference [between the new Samsung phone and the iPhone] was truly that of Heaven and Earth.” 152 However, Apple provided evidence of statements from Samsung’s executives that would
lead a reasonable individual to believe that Samsung sought to create
a product which closely resembled the iPhone. 153 Samsung’s market
share skyrocketed “from 5% to 20% in just two years” after creating
smartphones, which directly competed with the iPhone. 154 Wired
Magazine published a story about the similarity of the new Samsung
Vibrant and the Apple iPhone, which noted that the Vibrant’s design
“was shockingly similar to the iPhone 3G: the rounded curves at the
corners, the candy bar shape, the glossy, black finish and the chromecolored metallic border around the display.” 155 The article went on to
conclude, “[T]here’s little to make the [Vibrant] notable, apart from
its striking similarity to the iPhone.” 156 Further, acknowledging that
Samsung is a “sophisticated company,” Apple argued that Samsung
“chose to copy the design innovations of its biggest competitor and
profited significantly from doing so.” 157
150

Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5.
Arguably, Apple has led a revolution in the area of smartphone design. This, perhaps,
is the reason why many publications have continuously, from the iPhone’s inception, covered design aspects of new smartphone devices. Since the introduction of the iPhone, most,
if not all, new smartphones have in one way or another been inspired or influenced by Apple’s design of the iPhone. A defendant will not be found liable for patent infringement
solely on the basis of being inspired by another product. The defendant must, as in Samsung’s case here, actually violate and copy a design for which the plaintiff owns a registered
and active patent.
152 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9.
153 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9 (“Let’s make something like the iPhone.”).
154 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 10.
155 Priya Ganapati, First Look: Samsung Vibrant Rips Off iPhone 3G Design, WIRED
MAGAZINE (July 15, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/07/first-look-samsung-vibrantrips-off-iphone-3g-design/; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9, 11.
156 See supra note 155.
157 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3-4.
151
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Since the jury found that “eighteen Samsung smartphone
models infringed Apple’s design patents,” 158 a logical conclusion can
be drawn that “the design of eighteen separate Samsung smartphones
was ‘substantially similar’ to the patented design of the iPhone.” 159
The substantial similarity, Apple argued, demands a narrow reading
of Section 289 and the award equal to the total profits. 160
3. Language of Section 289
Samsung, Apple argued, “introduced no evidence that the relevant articles of manufacture were anything other than the whole
smartphones and never offered any calculation of Section 289 damages based on anything other than their entire phones.” 161 A narrower reading of the statute would result in damages for infringement of
one component of a multicomponent device to be equal to all profits
derived from the sale of the device. 162 This narrower interpretation
would clearly work in Apple’s favor, as it would permit it to keep the
$399 million in damages awarded by the lower courts rather than be
entitled to only a small fraction, proportionate to the actual infringing
components. 163
Since the Federal Circuit applied a narrow reading of Section
289 of the Patent Act, Apple argued that the Supreme Court should
affirm this narrow reading. 164 The Supreme Court, however, reversed
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and held the lower court could use
a broader reading of Section 289. 165
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

The Supreme Court’s holding did not clarify the main question at hand. 166 By simply holding that the article of manufacture
definition applied by the Federal Circuit was too narrow, the Court

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14.
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
Id.
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failed to devise a rule to guide lower courts. 167 The decision threatens to cause confusion among lower courts and a split in cases at the
Federal Circuit. 168
In a relatively brief and unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the narrow reading of Section 289 as applied by the
Federal Circuit. 169 The Court limited its holding to resolving the
question: “[W]hether, in the case of a multi-component product, the
relevant article of manufacture must always be the end product sold
to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product?”170 By limiting itself to that very question, the Court constrained
itself to resolving the issue in only one way. 171 The Court held that
“the term article of manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a
product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product.” 172 In some cases, the Supreme Court observed “a patent holder
will sometimes be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a component of the end product.” 173 By rejecting the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading, which the Court stated “cannot be squared with the text
of Section 289,” the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Federal Circuit to determine “whether, for each of the design patents
at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or
a particular smartphone component.” 174
On February 7, 2017 the Federal Circuit issued its per curiam
decision to remand the case to the District Court, which is “better positioned to parse the record” of this litigation. 175 On remand, the district court would be able to determine whether a new trial on the issue
of damages is necessary. 176 If it orders a new trial, the district court
“will have the opportunity to set forth a test for identifying the rele167

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
169 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429.
170 Id. at 434.
171 As first-year law students learn, the use of the word “always” in a sentence is always
fatal, as there are almost always exceptions.
172 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 435. This ruling is not entirely consistent with Samsung’s recommendation that the Supreme Court hold that damages resulting from the infringement of one
article in a multi-article product shall not result in damages equal to the total profits derived
from the sale of the end product.
173 Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
174 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436.
175 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 7, 2017).
176 Id.
168
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vant article of manufacture” under Section 289. 177 To formulate a
test, the district court most likely will consider various tests that prior
courts have established, such as the apportionment approach, to avoid
repeating failed tests. 178
VII.

APPORTIONMENT AND ITS HISTORY

The concept of apportionment resulted in many complex issues of proof for design patent holders who were “required to show
what portion of the infringer’s profit, or of his own lost profit, was
due to the design and what portion was due to the article itself.”179
The owner of the design patent “could recover only the proportionate
amounts of profits that were proven to be attributable to the presented
feature.” 180
Apportionment was a requirement until the case of Dobson v.
Dornan (1886), 181 which involved an infringement of a carpet design. 182 The plaintiff was unable to present evidence on whether the
purchasers of the defendant’s infringing carpets purchased the carpets
based on the design, or whether the purchasers would have purchased
the carpets without the infringing design. 183 The Supreme Court
awarded the design patent holder only six cents, a nominal sum, after
the patent holder was unable to show what portion of the “infringer’s
profits was due to the patented design and what portion was due to
the unpatented [design].” 184
This decision, which Congress called a “virtual repeal” of design patent laws, led Congress to enact the Design Patent Act of
1887. 185 The House Committee on Patents, discussing this act, said
the following:
It is expedient that the infringer’s entire profit on the
177

Id.
Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10 (1886).
179 Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
180 Id. Under this test, Apple would have the burden of proof to show what portion of
Samsung’s profits was attributable to the user interface and to the rectangular roundedcorner shape design of the smartphone. The burden was on Apple to prove “proportionate
amounts of profits . . . attributable to the presented feature.” Id.
181 Dobson, 118 U.S. at 10.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id; see also Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1886).
185 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 17.
178
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article should be recoverable, as otherwise none of his
profit can be recovered, for it is not apportionable; and
it is just that the entire profit on the article should be
recoverable . . . , for it is the design that sells the article, and so that makes it possible to realize any profit
at all. 186
The Design Patent Act of 1887 applied “to any article of
manufacture” and was, therefore, not limited to any specific component of a device, but rather the finished product as a whole. 187 The
Second Circuit, in 1893, interpreted the provision in the following
way: “The rule which [C]ongress declared for the computation of
profits was the total profit from the manufacture or sale of the article
to which the design was applied, as distinguished from the preexisting rule of the profit which could be proved to be attributable to
the design.” 188 Simply, the Second Circuit held that if a manufacturer
of a product infringes on a patented design, the patent holder would
be entitled to the entirety of defendant’s profits, rather than only profits attributable to the patented design. 189
When Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952, the “total profit” language used in the Design Patent Act of 1887 was incorporated
into Section 289. 190 As Apple argued in its brief, the issue of identifying the relevant article of manufacture is up to the fact finder. 191
Based on case law dealing with Section 289, Apple asserted, the burden of proof falls on the defendant to prove what the relevant article
of manufacture is. 192 A proper analysis of the issue of damages is vital, as the economy relies on innovation and new ideas without which
economic progress would stall. 193
VIII. IMPORTANCE OF REWARDS FOR INNOVATION
A marketable product does not suddenly appear overnight. 194
186 Congressional Record – House, p. 834. Speaker: Mr. Martin on H.R. 8323; see also
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 17-18.
187 Congressional Record – House, p. 834. Speaker: Mr. Martin on H.R. 8323.
188 Untermeyer v. Freund, 58 F. 205, 212 (2d Cir. 1893).
189 Id.
190 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
191 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3.
192 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3.
193 See infra text accompanying notes 194-217.
194 Fred Vogelstein, The Day Google Had to ‘Start Over’ on Android, THE ATLANTIC
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A product is born as a simple idea; countless hours are spent developing that intangible idea into a tangible marketable product, which
ends up in the hands of consumers. 195 Whether that product is a massive success or failure, it is up to the purchasing public to determine
whether they will benefit from acquiring the given product. 196 Naturally, if the product is a failure, no other company or individual will
want to reproduce the product and try to cash in. 197 However, if the
product is a success, any investor will try to enter the market and try
to capitalize on its success. 198
Thus, a dilemma arises as to why any individual or company
should invest a large amount of time and money when the easier alternative is to just wait for somebody else to invest the time and
money and then simply free-load on the idea. 199 Patent law seeks to
solve the dilemma by rewarding the innovator who made such an investment with a patent. 200 The time and expense invested in the creation or invention of a new product is considerable, and a monopoly
for the production and sale of that invention is considered a reward
for the innovation. 201 Legal protection is necessary because without
it, competitors can simply free ride on an inventor’s idea without
(Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/the-day-googlehad-to-start-over-on-android/282479/ (“By January 2007, they’d all worked sixty-to-eightyhour weeks for fifteen months—some for more than two years—writing and testing code,
negotiating software licenses, and flying all over the world to find the right parts, suppliers,
and manufacturers.”).
195 Id.
196 Product/Service Features and Benefits, KAUFFMAN|ENTREPRENEURS (Jan. 18, 2007),
https://www.entrepreneurship.org/articles/2007/01/productservice-features-and-benefits.
197 See supra note 194.
198 Don Harris, Ten Reasons Chinese Companies Fail in the U.S., FORBES (July 21, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/21/ten-reasons-chinese-companies-fail-in-the-us/#427857d59e19 (“the companies don't want to invest much on design, because it's bound
to be copied by competitors right away.”); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167
(7th Cir. 1997) (“Ty began selling the ‘Beanie Babies’ line . . . in 1993, and it was the popularity of the line that induced [the defendant] to bring out its own line of bean-bag stuffed
animals three years later.”).
199 This is often a problem not only in the United States, but in China as well. Id.
200 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (stating that “the franchise which the
patent grants consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or
vending the thing patented.”).
201 The United States has long acknowledged the importance of the patent system in encouraging innovation. Indeed, “the encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.” Importantly, the patent system provides incentive to the innovative drug companies to continue costly
development efforts. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. D.C., 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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making any investments. 202 Along with that legal protection comes
another huge benefit to an innovator: “[P]atents operate by temporarily reducing competition.” 203
In today’s market-driven society, competition is enormous.204
Profit maximization is the biggest driver behind many innovations.205
The best way to achieve maximum profit is to create a unique product
that is in high demand, but which no other company is producing. 206
Intellectual property law provides legal protections to innovators who
create a product. 207
Thomas Jefferson said: “[S]ociety may give an exclusive right
to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encouragement to men
to pursue ideas which may produce utility.” 208 Although Jefferson
addressed an exclusive right in regard to utility patents, modern technology has focused a great deal on the design of new products and
not only on their functional aspects. 209 This “exclusive right to the
profits” provides an enormous benefit to the innovator, and encourages other entrepreneurs to create products. 210 These products, like

202

Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working
Paper (2d Series) 1, 3 (2000) (“Without legal protection, the creator of intellectual property
may be unable to recoup his investment, because competitors can free ride on it.”).
203 Vornado Air Circulation v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995).
204 Tapping Our Talent, N.Y. St. B.J., October 2002, at 5. (“[T]oday’s fast-paced, information-saturated society where the competition to be heard above the crowd is a daily challenge.”).
205 Juan-Carlos Ortiz, International Trade Agreements and Private Desalination Plants: Is
California’s Coast Safe? 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 676 (2009) (“[P]rivate companies are
driven by profits and will cut down costs in order to maximize profits.”).
206 Fred Vogelstein, supra note 194.
207 Ray K. Harris & Rodney J. Fuller, Technology Barriers: 21st Century IP Basics, ARIZ.
ATT'Y, January 2008, at 22 (“Intellectual property law is designed to encourage further discovery and innovation by protecting and rewarding . . . pioneering companies.”).
208 VI. Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 180-81 (Washington ed.). Although focusing on
the word “utility” it is arguable here that the idea incorporates design patents as well.
Thomas Jefferson (1743 – 1826) was not alive at the time the first design patent was issued
in 1842. Therefore, it is arguable that had design patents existed at the time of Thomas Jefferson’s life, he would have included them in his writings, considering his views on the importance of exclusive rights for inventors.
209 This observation is especially relevant to a corporation such as Apple which has a long
history, especially under the leadership of former-CEO Steve Jobs, of focusing much of its
efforts on the design of each product it releases. This focus on the beauty and aesthetic features of its products led to the 2016 release of a book entitled “Designed by Apple in California” (ISBN: 978-0-9975138-0-6 and 978-0-9975138-1-3) which is comprised solely of
photographs of Apple’s devices over the history of the company. Given this history, it cannot reasonably be doubted that Apple places an enormous value on its design patents.
210 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858).
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the iPhone, bring enormous advantages to society as a whole. 211
The creation of the iPhone was not an overnight phenomenon:
In 2004, Apple undertook a bet-the-company project
to enter the smartphone market. With no assurance of
success, Apple spent billions of dollars as hundreds of
its employees worked night[s], weekends, all the time
to create a new, original, and beautiful object, something that would really wow the world. Before launch,
Apple’s risky venture was viewed skeptically. But
upon its release in 2007, the iPhone was acclaimed as
a revolutionary product that set the standard for
smartphone design. 212
As evidenced by Apple, a corporation spends a significant amount of
time, energy, and resources on risky products. 213 The risk is often associated with enormous rewards, which are only possible as a result
of a monopoly on the new, groundbreaking product. 214 Without patent protection, the payoff for risk taking would not be adequate, and
society would suffer. 215 This payoff should be safeguarded by laws,
which provide deterrence to potential infringers, as well as guaranteeing financial rewards to inventors. 216 To formulate a proper method
or test for damages for infringement of multi-component devices, the
District Court should first look at the calculation of damages in utility
parent cases. 217

211 Id. (“It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted
to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the
public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and
securing that monopoly.”).
212 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at Introduction.
213 Tim Bajarin, Why Apple is Spending Crazy Amounts of Money on New Ideas, TIME
MAGAZINE (May 18, 2016), http://time.com/4339940/apple-rd-research-development/ (stating that Apple spent $10 billion on research and development in the first half of 2016).
214 See supra note 2 (establishing that a patent will provide a monopoly, preventing anybody from entering into direct competition).
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (establishes that patents are a way “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).
216 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006); § 35 U.S.C. 284 (2006).
217 However, the Supreme Court could review the same case. When the District Court
establishes a test for damages in multi-component devices, the case might be appealed to the
Federal Circuit followed by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
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APPROACHES TO DAMAGES IN UTILITY PATENT CASES

In analyzing how the Supreme Court should rule in a design
patent infringement case, it is helpful to observe how courts decide
damages for other intellectual property infringement cases. 218 Section 284, which deals with utility patent damages, states the following:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court
shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed. Increased damages under this paragraph
shall not apply to provisional rights undersection
154(d).
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to
the determination of damages or of what royalty
would be reasonable under the circumstances. 219
The statute sets the floor and ceiling for damages in utility patent infringement cases. 220 The minimum damages available under
this statute are the “reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,” along with interest and costs. 221 The maximum
damages permitted are equivalent to three times the assessed
amount. 222 The key in this statute is the option of a compulsory license. 223 Although compulsory licenses in patent law are very limited, and generally reserved for use by the federal government, there
is no statute preventing the court’s use of a compulsory license in
non-government infringement. 224 The core function of Section 284
218

See supra text accompanying notes 22-47.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
224 See infra note 274 and accompanying text on the limited use of compulsory patent licensing by the government in pharmaceuticals.
219
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damages in utility patent cases is to ensure adequate and equitable
damages. 225 The statute lays out a road map for a court to apply to
ensure proper damages are awarded. 226 There is no reason why Section 284 cannot be expanded to apply to Section 289. 227
The problem with compulsory damages is the difficulty in determining an adequate amount as there is no bargaining process at the
time of the infringement. 228 Section 1498 deals with the government’s patent licensing power. 229 The statute requires the payment of
“reasonable and entire compensation” for the term of use of the patent. 230 However, courts may interpret the ambiguous wording to
mean reasonable, as opposed to fair and true market value. 231 Additionally, the granting of compulsory licenses violates the basis tenet
of patent law, which provides that a patent holder has the exclusive
right to sell, use, and manufacture the patented article. 232 The District
Court could apply some of these ideas to one of the proposed solutions discussed in the next section.
X.

PROPOSED JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS

The issue presented in the Apple litigation is likely to be repeated at some point in the near future. 233 If Congress fails to amend
Section 289, there are four ways in which the courts, in later decisions, could clarify the issue. 234

225

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. (Use of the word ‘reasonable’ rather than ‘market value’ or ‘fair value.’).
229 28 U.S.C.A. 1498 (2006).
230 Id.
231 Arguments can be made that when the government infringes on a patent and grants a
compulsory license, the holder of the patent will have a new stream of revenue and thereby
will benefit from the compulsory license. For a deeper analysis, see Amanda Mitchell,
Tamiflu, the Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses: An Exploration of the Government's
Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95 CAL. L. REV. 535, 542 (2007).
232 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015).
233 Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Samsung v. Apple, numerous design patent cases
dealt with substantially the same issue in the Federal Circuit and came to different conclusions. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Nike Inc. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
234 See discussion supra Sections X(A), X(B), X(C), and X(D). Additionally, the District
Court could adopt an approach in Apple.
226
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A. The Bottom Line Approach–Federal Circuit’s Holding
The first solution can be called “the bottom line approach.”
The Supreme Court could take a very harsh stance against an infringer and award the plaintiff every penny of profit the defendant derived
from the sale of each device that contained any design patent owned
by the plaintiff. This would involve a very simple and straightforward one-part test. The only question that would be asked is: Does
the product in question contain any component, regardless of how
small, that violates an existing design patent? 235 The plaintiff would
have the burden to show the existence of a valid and active patent,
and that the article in question either contains or uses the patented
component. 236 If the plaintiff meets its burden, then the infringer is
liable for any profit it earned by selling the product to its customers. 237 If the Supreme Court implements this test, any existing patent
would be strengthened because a company or individual would think
twice before manufacturing a product that comes very close to infringing on an existing patent in fear that all profits would be lost. 238
This test would apply Apple’s narrow interpretation of Section 289. 239 Apple argued that a final product is simply one article of
manufacture, not a composite of hundreds or thousands of individual
articles of manufacture. 240 Under Apple’s interpretation of article of
manufacture, because three design patents were infringed and included in Samsung’s final product, Samsung should be “liable to [Apple]
to the extent of [Samsung’s] total profit.” 241 However, Samsung argued, in both its brief to the Supreme Court and during the oral arguments, that the final product can contain hundreds or thousands of
articles of manufacture, and thus, the award of total profits would be
inequitable. 242
In a case such as Apple, it is undeniable that both parties are
235 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015) (establishing the patent holder’s right to exclude others
from “making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented article).
236 David Herr, et al., Declaratory Judgments-Patent Infringement-Burden of Proof, 29 (3)
FED. LITIGATOR 5 (providing that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff patent holder, even in
declaratory judgment actions).
237 Id. (plaintiff carries the burden of proof).
238 Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (holding that enhanced
damages may be “justified where the infringer acted deliberately or willfully”).
239 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14.
240 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14.
241 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
242 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 44.
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large, international, sophisticated companies. 243 Apple alone has over
500 in-house attorneys. 244 With the legal resources of each corporation so large, each is unquestionably aware of the patents owned by
their competitors. 245 Thus, if one of the two companies creates a
product, a component of which infringes one or more patents of its
direct competitor, it is not an oversight. 246 Although it is possible
that a company may believe that its product or feature is not infringing the patent, it is likely to be aware of the existence of a substantially similar product or feature, which is patented. 247 Considering that a
company like Samsung is undisputedly a sophisticated manufacturer,
it has the resources to safeguard itself against a potential infringement
of another’s patents. 248 An infringement of a direct competitor’s patent is no mistake, but is highly likely to be known. 249 This
knowledge supports the imposition of a heavy penalty on the infringer. If the infringer’s bottom line is impacted, by penalizing the infringer to the extent of his total profits and possible punitive damages, there is a larger deterrence factor in the future. 250
This approach, applied by the Federal Circuit in Apple Inc.,
can have weighty and seemingly unfair ramifications. 251 This ruling
can be used as precedent to hold “an automobile manufacturer . . . liable for its entire profits from a particular car model if that model
contained, say, an infringing tail light.” 252 In the wake of Apple Inc.,
243 Samantha Sharf, The World’s Largest Tech Companies 2016, FORBES (May 26, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2016/05/26/the-worlds-largest-tech-companies2016-apple-bests-samsung-microsoft-and-alphabet/#2c87b69bb661 (discussing that Apple
had $233 billion in revenue, $53 billion in profit, $239 billion in assets and a market value of
$586 billion in 2016. Samsung had $177 billion in revenue, $16.5 billion in profit, $206 billion in assets and a $216 billion market value).
244 Peter Robinson, Here Are the Legal Generals Behind Apple’s Brawl With the FBI,
TECHNOLOGY
(March
4,
2016),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-04/apple-defense-pairs-cyberpioneerwith-architect-of-samsung-brawl.
245 The filing of a patent requires a thorough research of prior art. That research reveals
patents, which are similar in nature to the research.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See supra note 243 for Samsung’s market value.
249 Prior art searches are conducted by patent attorneys on a regular basis to check whether
new concepts infringe on already existing patents.
250 See Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
general concept of money damages as a deterrent to corporations).
251 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
252 Not based on an actual case, this is an illustrative example of the potential ramifications of applying this test. Jason Rantanen, Apple v. Samsung: Design Patents Win,
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high damage claims are going to be much more credible. 253 Upholding the Federal Circuit’s ruling will open floodgates to litigation.254
A higher award in successful litigation is likely to motivate patentholders to file suit when they believe their patents are being infringed. 255
A.

Fairness and Equity Approach

The second approach is a fairer and more reasonable option.
Upon a finding of infringement of a design patent, the court would
look at the final article of manufacture and evaluate the proportion of
the total article, which infringes on the design patent. 256 For example, if the final article is made up of 100 smaller articles, each covered by its own patent, and three of those smaller articles are infringed patents, the total damages will be closer to three percent of
the total profits earned by the patent infringer. 257 Under this approach, an exception would have to be made in situations where the
infringed articles disproportionately contribute to the success of the
product. 258 If the exception were to apply, the plaintiff would have
the burden to show the disproportionate effect of the article in question on the end product. 259
A main idea behind capitalism is that an individual creates a
product, invests his or her time and money in it and, assuming there
is market demand for it, receives a return on investment. 260 It would
be contrary to our economic system for one company to profit from a
product, or component of a product, which the company did not create, manufacture, invest in, or take a risk in. 261 Simply put, this approach would avoid unjust enrichment for the patent holder who
could potentially see financial rewards for articles he did not cre-

PATENTLYO (May 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/samsung-designpatents.html.
253 Id.
254 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
255 Considering the high expense of litigating patent cases, the award for successful litigation must be high enough to make the litigation worthwhile and profitable.
256 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
258 See infra note 287.
259 See supra note 236.
260 See supra note 201.
261 An important exception here is using articles, which are in the public domain.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/22

30

Rogowski: Design Patent Infringement

2017

DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT

1273

ate. 262
In Apple, there is no question that Samsung infringed on three
patents owned by Apple in the manufacture and sale of eighteen
smartphones. 263 The District Court, in analyzing the amount of damages Apple should be entitled to, would have to determine the proportion of components in Samsung’s smartphone to the infringed components to determine the value of the patents that Samsung
infringed. 264 Once the value is determined, Samsung would be liable
to Apple only for the value of the patents actually infringed. 265 This
is a fairer and more equitable resolution because although three design patents were infringed, Samsung’s final product contained hundreds, if not thousands, of components that were not copied. 266 All of
those components cost millions of dollars to develop and manufacture, as well as countless time spent by hundreds of developers and
manufacturers to create. 267 If Apple was entitled to receive all profits
for the smartphone containing the infringed patents, Apple would be
receiving profits for which it neither developed nor invested time or
money. 268
B.

Compulsory License Approach

A third approach would be a court-mandated retroactive licensing agreement. A licensing agreement would force the infringer
to pay a fair and reasonable fee to the infringed party, starting with
the date of the first infringement. 269 This approach is currently utilized in lawsuits where the federal government or a government con-

262 Avoiding unjust enrichment is generally a contract law issue, governed by state law. §
4:15. Unjust Enrichment-Limitations on Application, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 4:15.
However, an unjust enrichment claim may be preempted by federal law. § 4:15. Id. See Ultra-Precision Manufacturing, LTD. v. Ford Motor Company, 411 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(providing an example of preemption of a state unjust enrichment claim by federal patent
law).
263 See generally Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
264 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
266 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001.
267 Fred Vogelstein, supra note 194 (“By January 2007, they’d all worked sixty-to-eightyhour weeks for fifteen months—some for more than two years—writing and testing code,
negotiating software licenses, and flying all over the world to find the right parts, suppliers,
and manufacturers.”).
268 Arguably, some of these damages could be considered punitive in nature.
269 This approach is similar to that of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948).
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tractor infringes on a patent. 270 If a patent is “used or manufactured
by or for the United States without license of the owner . . . the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” 271 In such circumstances, the government is permitted to continue to use the patent
subject to the compulsory license. 272 However, the government will
have to properly compensate the patent holder for the use of his invention. 273
The compulsory license approach has also been recently used
internationally in situations where the government needs to use a patented drug whose price is too steep. 274 For example, in Thailand, between 2006 and 2007, two compulsory licenses were issued by the
public health authorities “on AIDS drugs and one on clopidogrel bisulfate (Plavix), a major cardiovascular treatment.” 275 In the United
States, a compulsory license threat was issued against pharmaceutical
company Bayer as a result of the Anthrax scare. 276 The United States
intended to “stockpile . . . ciprofloxacin (Cipro) . . . as a defense
against anthrax.” 277 Before the government moved to do so, Bayer
negotiated with the government and lowered the price of Cipro to
avoid the compulsory license. 278 However, the government’s use of a
compulsory license for a lifesaving drug to benefit the general welfare and health of its citizens is distinguishable from a potential compulsory license on a design patent of an article that is used to manufacture a smartphone. 279
Under this approach, there would be little deterrence for com270

28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948).
Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions,
JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE ETHICS (2009).
275 Id. (also describing compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs in Rwanda (2007), Indonesia
(2004 and 2008), Malaysia (2004), Brazil (2003 and 2007), Zambia (2004), Zimbabwe
(2004), Mozambique (2004)).
276 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions,
JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE ETHICS 247, 249-50 (2009).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Currently, in the United States compulsory licenses for patents are limited to government use. Technically, a license is not provided to the United States government for its use
of a patented article, but rather the United States pays the patent holder compensation equivalent to the lost profits or reasonable royalties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
271
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panies and individuals to infringe patents. 280 They would likely
choose to infringe on the patents, and if the patent owner decided to
engage in costly litigation, they could simply pay the patents’ fair
market-value. 281 Additionally, a company would engage in a costbenefit analysis, and if the cost of a compulsory license outweighed
the cost to innovate and manufacture an alternate, non-patent infringing, article, it would simply choose to infringe on the patent. 282 Furthermore, this approach would violate the basic goal of patent law,
which is to create a monopoly for the patent-holder. 283
This licensing agreement would allow Samsung to retroactively use the three design patents owned by Apple, but it would be
forced to pay. 284 The court would use available data and expert testimony to determine the value of each of the three Apple design patents. 285 Once a value is determined, Samsung would be forced to
pay the fair value of the compulsory license. 286
C.

The Customer Demand Approach

A fourth approach focuses on customer demand. The Supreme Court could grant certiorari for cases where only a small percentage of all components of the final product, rather than the entire
product, infringes on existing patents; thus, it is important for the
courts to consider the customer’s perspective. Damages equivalent to
the size of total profits under Section 289 should be available for the
entire end-product “if the patented design is substantially the basis for
customer demand for the entire article.” 287
A judicially created extension of damages for utility patents
280 For a general discussion of damages as deterrents, see Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring
the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L. J. 347 (1998).
281 This is a similar concept as in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948).
282 Cost-Benefit Analysis, ENTREPRENEUR,
https://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/cost-benefit-analysis (last visited March 24,
2017).
283 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
284 Jon Matthews, Renewing Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why Abuses
of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare Industry, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. ISS. 1 (2010) (“Compulsory licenses are retroactive
by nature.”).
285 This is necessary in order to determine the proper value, as in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498
(1948).
286 Id.
287 Gary L. Griswold, 35 USC § 289 – An Important Feature of US Design Patent Law,
IPO LAW JOURNAL (Apr. 6, 2015).
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could be applied to design patents. 288 This “entire market value rule”
for utility patents is best explained by Cornell University v. HewlettPackard Co. 289
(1) The infringing components must be the basis for
customer demand for the entire machine including the
parts beyond the claimed innovation, (2) the individual
infringing and non-infringing components must be
sold so that they constitute a functional unit or are
parts of a complete machine or single assemble of
parts, and (3) the individual infringing and noninfringing components must be analogous to a single
functioning unit. 290
Thus, if the customer purchases a product primarily for the components, which were protected by the infringed patent, the patent-holder
would be entitled to the entire market share, or the entire profit, of the
given product. 291 Furthermore, the infringing component must be a
part of the completed end-product, rather than a separate article, and
serve as a single functioning unit. 292
This approach would resolve the hypothetical presented in
Subsection A, where an automobile manufacturer would be liable for
the entire profits of a specific car model that infringed on a patent for
a tail light. 293 In that hypothetical, analyzed under this approach, the
question would be whether the tail light in that specific car model
was a substantial factor in the customer’s purchasing of the car model. 294 If the answer was in the affirmative, then the patent holder
would be able to recover the entire sum of the profits received by the
automobile manufacturer for the sale of the product which contained
the infringed patent. 295 If, however, the answer was no, then the patent holder would only be entitled to a small portion, apportioned to

288

Id.
Patent holder brought a lawsuit against a competitor for infringement of an instructionissuing mechanism. The jury ruled in favor of the patent holder. Cornell University v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
294 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
289
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the significance of the tail light to the car model as a whole. 296 The
burden of proof would be on the plaintiff to prove that the customer
demand for the product was substantially based on the infringing
component. 297 To satisfy the substantial standard, the court should
apply the “but-for” test, by determining whether but for the infringing
component the consumer would not have purchased this product. 298
This approach can be used to analyze the Apple case. Samsung argued in its brief, “[T]he undisputed evidence in the record
shows that consumers purchased Samsung and other Android phones
overwhelmingly because of their functional, non-design features.”299
This argument directly fulfills factor one of the entire market value
rule established in Cornell University. 300 Further citing Apple’s market data, Samsung argued that “a phone’s ‘design’ in general was a
reason for only 1% of Apple purchases and 5% of Android purchases,
far below other considerations such as services, multimedia functions, ease of use, and brand.” 301 If the District Court were to approve the facts presented by Samsung, as it should, considering Apple failed to rebut them, then under the “entire market value rule,” as
explained in Cornell University, Samsung’s device would not meet
the first requirement that “the infringing components must be the basis for customer demand for the entire machine including the parts
beyond the claimed innovation.” 302
XI.

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS

Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 289 on July 19, 1952. 303 As
with any statute, Congress has the power to amend, repeal, or replace
it. 304 In order to provide clarity in future cases involving complex litigation dealing with patent infringement in multicomponent products,

296

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 236.
298 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
299 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9.
300 Cornell University, 609 F. Supp. 2d. 279.
301 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10.
302 Cornell University, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
303 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
304 That power even extends to constitutional amendments. For example, Congress passed
the 18th Amendment prohibiting the sale of alcohol on December 18, 1917. In 1933, Congress repealed it by passing the 21st Amendment.
297
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Congress could clarify Section 289. 305 Section 351 is the definitional
section, which could be amended to add a narrower definition of the
phrase article of manufacture. 306 Alternatively, 35 U.S.C. § 289
could be amended with language narrowing the definition of article
of manufacture. 307
All federal laws are drafted and passed by the United States
Congress; 308 Section 289 is no different. 309 The province of the
courts is to interpret laws, not to write or amend the laws. 310 The issue exposed by Apple is one which requires the law to be amended,
not interpreted. As time progresses, so does technological innovation. 311 Patented articles become more complex, involve more components, and the number of patents on each article increases as
well. 312
Congress should seek to balance the interests of all parties.313
The patent holder, under current federal legislation, possesses the exclusive right to manufacture, sell, and use its patented article. 314 That
right, which is the keystone of patent law, must be kept strong.315
Otherwise, the monopoly, which drives up financial benefits for the
patent holder, will be diminished, leading to fewer rewards for the
innovation, which in turn slows down the wheels of progress and innovation. 316 Equally important, the public’s interest must be taken
305 Congress could simply amend the definitional section of Title 35 to include article of
manufacture.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States ….”).
309 35 U.S.C. § 289 was passed by the United States Congress as part of the Patent Act of
1952.
310 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
311 Tom
Warren, iPhone: A Visual History, THE VERGE (Sep. 9, 2014),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/9/6125849/iphone-history-pictures (providing that every
new release of a smartphone brings new features, new designs, each more complex).
312 In 2015, Apple was awarded 1,938 patents; in 2016, Apple was awarded 2,102 patents.
http://www.ificlaims.com/index.php?page=misc_top_50_2016.
313 Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (providing
an example of Congress’s balancing the interests for the statutory period of exclusivity).
314 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015).
315 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858) (discussing the concept that the monopoly provided to the patent holder benefits both the inventor and the public or community
at large).
316 Martin I. Finston & David M. La Bruno, Recondite Harmonies of Interest-Where
Standards and Patents Meet, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE (Oct. 2012) (“Innovation
drives the U.S. economy, and the granting of patents is one of the ways the U.S. government
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into consideration. 317 Congress, by giving the patent holder a monopoly, has already determined that the public will be served well
when one individual or corporation holds the exclusive right to manufacture. 318 Rewarding the patent holder with the full value of lost
profit will not have a negative impact on the public. 319 Furthermore,
any member of the public might be the next inventor who will demand appropriate damages if his invention is infringed. 320
A congressional amendment would provide clarity for future
similarly situated parties. 321 There would no longer be a need for the
Supreme Court, or any other court, to struggle with defining this key
phrase, which would be determinative in deciding multi-million dollar design patent infringement litigations. 322 A body of legislators,
elected by the People, is the appropriate venue for amending federal
law, not a body of nine unelected individuals who are not representative of the Nation. 323
XII.

CONCLUSION

If there is a patent, which is infringed, the patent holder is entitled to damages from the infringer. 324 That simple notion grows extremely complex when dealing with multicomponent products, such
encourages and fosters innovation in this country.”).
317 Kendall, 62 U.S. at 327-28. (“It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly.”).
318 Id.
319 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006) (providing that the total amount of profits in case of infringement is appropriate, thus showing congressional thinking that the awards of total profits will
not negatively impact society).
320 The United States Patent and Trademark Office itself acknowledges that not all patent
holders are wealthy corporations. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-feeschedule#Patent%20Fees (last visited, March 21, 2017). For those that file for a patent
online, The PTO provides for three price scales--large entity, small entity, and micro entity.
Id. That acknowledgement clarifies that every day individuals might find themselves filing
for a patent. Id.
321 A clear statute would eliminate any argument between the parties as to what the law
actually is.
322 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 (establishing a case and controversy requirement, which would
be nonexistent if a clear and unambiguous statute existed on this issue).
323 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court.”).
324 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
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as smartphones. 325 The appropriate amount of damages that the patent holder is entitled to is an open question. 326
In a heavily anticipated ruling, the Supreme Court took a very
limited approach to the question regarding appropriate damages for
design patent infringement under Section 289. 327 Simply, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of
Section 289 was not correct. 328 The Court held that “the term article
of manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a product sold to
a consumer as well as a component of that product.” 329
The Court’s unanimous decision declined to establish a test in
cases dealing with Section 289 damages, and remanded the case to
the Federal Circuit. 330 Further, rather than narrow the definition to
provide clarity to lower courts, the Court broadened the definition.331
In turn, the Federal Circuit held that the district court is best able to
handle the issues at hand, and expressly gave the district court the
“opportunity to set forth a test for identifying the relevant article of
manufacture” under Section 289. 332 It is up to the District Court for
the Northern District of California to be the leader in formulating the
test, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in cases of design
patent infringement in multicomponent devices. 333
Today, because of the Supreme Court’s ruling, we know what
an article of manufacture is not. 334 An article of manufacture is not
always the finished end-product, nor is it always just a component of
the finished end-product. 335 Without a test established by the Supreme Court dealing with Section 289 damages, lower courts will
continue to struggle with awarding appropriate damages. 336
325

See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 435.
330 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429.
331 Id.
332 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 7, 2017).
333 Id.
334 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429.
335 Id.
336 See generally Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337. Notably, just three months after the Supreme
Court ruling, the Federal Circuit ordered a new trial to determine appropriate damages in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apple. Nordock, Inc. v. Systems, Inc., No. 20141762, 2017 WL 1034379 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 2017). Acknowledging that the Supreme Court
326
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Without congressional action, the District Court for the
Northern District of California should adopt the customer demand
approach. If the plaintiff is able to carry the burden of proving to the
fact finder that the sale of defendant’s product was fueled substantially by a component, which infringes on the plaintiff’s patent, the
plaintiff should be entitled to the sum of the total profits of the defendant. The court should carry over the “entire market value rule”
from utility patents as elaborated by Cornell University. 337 Apportionment in complex devices, such as a smartphone, would be a futile
task for a jury. 338 The need for clarity, simplicity, and deterrence
makes the “entire market value rule” the ultimate test that the District
Court should apply, and ultimately that the Supreme Court should
adopt. Until a specific test is adopted for this issue, there is guaranteed to be confusion, uncertainty, venue shopping, and a whole lot of
lawyering. 339

in Apple held that the term article of manufacture is “broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product,” the Federal Circuit went on to say
that the Supreme Court did not establish a test for the Circuit to follow. Id. Here, one party
argued that the entire dock leveler at issue is the proper relevant article of manufacture. Id.
The other party argued that the relevant article of manufacture is a smaller component of the
end-product (the “lip and hinge plate,” rather than the entire dock leveler). Id. The Federal
Circuit, not having a test to follow, remanded the case to the District Court to “revisit and
restructure its jury instructions” for appropriate damages under Section 289. Id.
337 See supra note 291 and accompanying text; Cornell University, 609 F. Supp 2d at 28687.
338 i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (providing an
example of a dispute regarding the amount of damages for the infringement of a patent for a
“method and system for manipulating the architecture and the content of a document separately from each other.” U.S. Patent 5,787,449 (issued July 28, 1998)).
339 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
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